Focal points in tacit bargaining problems: Experimental evidence  by Isoni, Andrea et al.
Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect
European Economic Review
European Economic Review 59 (2013) 167–1880014-29
http://d
n Corr
E-mjournal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/eerFocal points in tacit bargaining problems:
Experimental evidence
Andrea Isoni a, Anders Poulsen b, Robert Sugden c,n, Kei Tsutsuid
a Behavioural Science Group, Warwick Business School, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
b School of Economics and Centre for Experimental and Behavioural Social Science, University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ, UK
c School of Economics, Centre for Experimental and Behavioural Social Science and Centre for Competition Policy, University of East
Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ, UK
d Frankfurt School of Finance & Management, Sonnemannstraße 9-11, 60314 Frankfurt, Germanya r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 22 December 2011
Accepted 17 December 2012
Available online 27 December 2012
JEL classiﬁcation:
C72
C78
C91
Keywords:
Tacit bargaining
Relational cue
Payoff-irrelevant cue
Focal point21& 2013 Elsevier B.V.
x.doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2012.12.005
esponding author. Tel.: þ44 1603 593423.
ail address: r.sugden@uea.ac.uk (R. Sugden).
Open access under CC BYa b s t r a c t
We use a new experimental design to test Schelling’s hypotheses about the nature
and effectiveness of focal points in tacit bargaining problems. In our design, as in many
real-world bargaining problems, each player’s strategies are framed as proposals about
what part of a stock of valuable objects she is to take, and there are payoff-irrelevant cues
which deﬁne relations between players and objects. In line with Schelling’s hypotheses,
we ﬁnd that such cues serve as powerful focal points. Their presence increases efﬁciency
even in games where there is no efﬁcient and equal division, and induces systematically
unequal payoff distributions.
& 2013 Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY license.1. IntroductionSuppose a German, a Frenchman, and a Spaniard to come into a room, where there are placed upon the table
three bottles of wine, Rheinish, Burgundy and Port; and suppose they should fall a quarrelling about the
division of them; a person, who was chosen for umpire, would naturally, to shew his impartiality, give
everyone the product of his own country: And this from a principle, which, in some measure, is the source of
those laws of nature, that ascribe property to occupation, prescription and accession. Hume (1739–1740,
pp. 509–510).Thomas Schelling’s Strategy of Conﬂict is universally recognised as the foundation of the theory of focal points. Many of
Schelling’s best-known examples of focal points are Nash equilibria in symmetric matching games. In a matching game,
each of (usually) two players independently chooses one label (for example, ‘heads’ or ‘tails’) from the same set of options,
and each receives a positive payoff if and only if both choose the same label. The game is symmetric if players’ payoffs,
conditional on their choosing the same label, are independent of which label is chosen. It is now well established that
players of such games are often able to achieve high degrees of coordination by using salient properties of the labels (e.g.
Schelling, 1960, pp. 54–58; Mehta et al., 1994a, 1994b; Bacharach and Bernasconi, 1997; Crawford et al., 2008; Bardsley license.
A. Isoni et al. / European Economic Review 59 (2013) 167–188168et al., 2010). An equilibrium that is selected by players in response to the salience of its label is the focal point of the
relevant game.
However, as Schelling (1960, pp. 53–54) makes clear, one of the main intended applications of his theory is to
bargaining problems in which communication is incomplete or impossible—in his terminology, problems of tacit
bargaining. Although his particular interest is in tacit bargaining between opposing military strategists seeking to avoid
or limit warfare, he envisages important economic applications for the theory—for example, the problem faced by
competing ﬁrms that have common interests in collusive practices but are legally debarred from negotiating these
explicitly. He proposes the hypothesis that the outcomes of games that model tacit bargaining can be affected by features
that provide no information about payoffs, but merely attach apparently arbitrary labels to players, strategies or strategy
proﬁles in what (as viewed by conventional game theory) is already a fully-speciﬁed game. In Schelling’s theory, such
labels – which we will call payoff-irrelevant cues – may prime mental associations with players’ experiences outside the
game, and players’ perceptions of focal points may be inﬂuenced by their attitudes to those experiences. Crucially,
however, players are assumed to have common knowledge of the actual payoffs of the game and to recognise that the cues
that identify a particular solution as focal provide no additional information about those payoffs.
Why might one expect this hypothesis to be true? Schelling’s answer, as we understand it, is that real-world problems
of tacit bargaining can be modelled as games in which players have a common interest in coordinating on any of a set of
alternative Nash equilibria. Payoff-irrelevant cues provide an equilibrium selection device. Even though the players’
interests are not completely aligned, both recognise that if they are to coordinate, they must use whatever cues are
available: ‘beggars cannot be choosers when fortune gives the signals’ (p. 300). This may result in an outcome that ‘quite
arbitrarily condemns one of the players to a smaller gain than the other for reasons that may seem purely accidental or
incidental. But we have to suppose that a rational player can discipline himself to accept the lesser share if the clue points
that way’ (p. 286).
This intuition has been expressed more formally in a family of more recent theories of focal points. In different ways,
these theories incorporate players’ perceptions of labels into the formal structure of a game and show that because of the
uniqueness of the labelling of a particular proﬁle of players’ actions, that proﬁle is a payoff-dominant Nash equilibrium
in the re-speciﬁed (or ‘framed’) game (Bacharach, 1993, 2006; Sugden, 1995; Casajus, 2001; Janssen, 2001, 2006).
This analysis can explain the use of focal points not only in symmetric matching games, but in mixed-motive games in general.
Given its potential relevance for economics, Schelling’s hypothesis about tacit bargaining has been subjected to
surprisingly few direct experimental tests.1 However, there has been some investigation of asymmetric matching
games—that is, matching games in which the payoffs have a Battle of the Sexes structure. Such games might be
interpreted as highly simpliﬁed models of some aspects of tacit bargaining. These studies have had mixed results. Cooper
et al. (1993) and Gu¨th et al. (1998) ﬁnd that designating one of the players in Battle of the Sexes as the ﬁrst mover, even
when the ﬁrst mover’s decision is not observed by the second mover (and hence interaction is strategically equivalent to a
simultaneous move game), increases the chances that coordination is achieved on that player’s preferred pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium. Holm (2000) ﬁnds that when it is common knowledge that a Battle of the Sexes game is being played
between a male and a female player, there is a tendency for coordination on the preferred equilibrium of the male player.2
In contrast, Crawford et al. (2008) ﬁnd that salient labels that work as focal points in symmetric matching games can fail to
induce coordination when payoffs are asymmetric. In the words of the title of their paper: ‘The power of focal points is
limited: even minute payoff asymmetry may yield large coordination failures’. They explain this observation by proposing
a model of behaviour in matching games, based on the level-k theory of Stahl and Wilson (1995) and Nagel (1995).3 If
Crawford et al.’s headline conclusion were true in general – if payoff-irrelevant cues had power only in the complete
absence of conﬂicts of interest – the theory of focal points would have little to contribute to the understanding of tacit
bargaining.
To try to reach ﬁrmer conclusions about the role of focal points in tacit bargaining, we investigate games with three
features that are often found in real-world bargaining situations, but that are not present in matching games. First, there is
a surplus that has to be divided between the two players, and the alternative strategies for each player are framed as
proposals about what part or share of that surplus the proposer is to take. Second, potential focal points are identiﬁed by
what we call relational cues—that is, by salient but payoff-irrelevant relations between particular players and particular
parts or shares of the surplus. Third, in order for the players’ proposals to constitute an agreement, it is not necessary that
they are exactly complementary; provided the players’ claims on the surplus do not overlap, each player receives what he
claimed. The ﬁrst two features are matters of framing or labelling, but the third differentiates the payoff matrices of our
games from those of matching games.1 Some preliminary results, broadly supportive of Schelling’s hypothesis, are reported by Mehta et al. (1992). Their design uses a kind of what we will
call ‘relational cue’, different from the one we use here.
2 This may be an effect of labelling, as Holm conjectures. Alternatively, it could be the result of real differences between the payoffs of male and
female players (for example, because of differences in attitudes to risk or inequality), or of players’ beliefs about such differences.
3 In Crawford et al.’s model, players at ‘level 0’ – the lowest level of a hierarchy of increasingly sophisticated modes of reasoning – favour ‘label-
salient’ strategies in common-interest games, but favour ‘payoff-salient’ strategies in other games. The idea of explaining focal points in terms of a
hierarchy of levels of reasoning, with salience understood as a property of choice at the lowest level, was ﬁrst proposed by Lewis (1969, pp. 24–36); it is
developed further by Mehta et al. (1994a) and Crawford et al. (in press).
A. Isoni et al. / European Economic Review 59 (2013) 167–188 169These features are prominent in a well-known game that Schelling (1960, pp. 58–67) uses as a model of tacit
bargaining, and on which he reports ‘informal’ experimental evidence of the power of payoff-irrelevant cues. In this game,
the players act as opposing army commanders, each of whom has the objective of occupying as much as possible of a
certain territory but without his troops coming into conﬂict with the other’s. Each player sees a map on which the current
locations of the armies are shown, along with various geographical features. The two players simultaneously choose the
limits of their troops’ advances. A substantial majority of Schelling’s respondents recognised a river on the map as the most
obvious limit to their respective advances, even though this divided the territory unequally. The relevant relation in this
case is spatial: each commander stands in a salient but payoff-irrelevant relationship to the territory on the side of the
river where his army is located.
The same features can be found in the bargaining problem described by Hume in the quotation at the beginning of our
paper. Prior to the intervention of the umpire, the three individuals are in dispute about how to divide a stock of objects of
value (the bottles of wine); presumably each is claiming some part of this stock. A salient relation of nationality associates
particular individuals with particular objects.4 This identiﬁes a resolution to their dispute that all parties can perceive as
‘natural’. Hume (1739–1740, pp. 501–513) uses this example to illustrate his theory of the origin of property, in which
property rights are conventions founded on mental associations ‘betwixt the idea of the person and that of the object’. In
this theory, the most important such relation is possession. The salience of possession is embedded in conventions which
give de facto property rights to ﬁrst possessors of the relevant objects (in Hume’s language, the principle of ‘occupation’),
or to individuals who have possessed them for a long time (‘prescription’). Hume also explains how property conventions
can be based on two-step relations of mental association: if an individual already has a de facto right in one object, a
convention may give him similar rights in other objects that are saliently related to the ﬁrst one (‘accession’).
There are clear analogies between Schelling’s abstract game and many real-world bargaining problems. For example,
consider the case of duopolists dividing up a market. Much as in Schelling’s game, spatial cues (such as the locations of the
ﬁrms’ factories and the conﬁguration of international boundaries) may make a particular geographical division of the
market highly salient. Alternatively, existing patterns of supply may provide precedent-based cues linking particular ﬁrms
to particular markets: each ﬁrm might take those markets in which it currently has the greater market share, or there
might be a tacit understanding that neither ﬁrm tries to sell to the other’s previous customers. In all these cases, the
relevant cues are relations between particular claimants (ﬁrms) and particular parts of the surplus that is to be divided
(markets or customers). As a slightly different example, consider a dispute between a multinational oil company and a
national government over the division of mineral royalties. Schelling (1960, pp. 67–68) suggests that if it is common
knowledge that a recent similar dispute between a different company and a different government ended in agreement on a
particular proportional division, that division may provide a focal point for the later bargaining problem. In this case, the
relevant cue takes the form of relations between particular claimants and particular shares of the surplus.
Our experimental design is based on a new representation of tacit bargaining. This representation has the same
essential features as Schelling’s army commanders game. In each of our games there is a stock of valuable objects; the two
players make independent claims on these objects, with the aim of claiming as much value as possible without trespassing
on one another’s claims; speciﬁc players are associated with speciﬁc objects by payoff-irrelevant relational cues. Our focus
is mainly on games in which there is no exhaustive division of the objects that equalises the players’ payoffs, and in which
relational cues single out a particular unequal division. We investigate how far the outcomes of these games are inﬂuenced
by those cues.
In Section 2, we describe our design. In Section 3, we describe the speciﬁc games used in the experiment. Section 4 gives
details about how the experiment was conducted. Section 5 reports our main ﬁndings. Section 6 compares our ﬁndings
with those of Crawford et al. and discusses issues of external validity. Section 7 concludes.2. The bargaining table design
Our experiment builds on a design used by Mehta et al. (1994a, 1994b) to investigate the effects of relational cues in
symmetric matching games. In their experiments, two players each see the same diagram of a grid, on which two squares
and a number of circles are located. Each player is instructed to assign each circle to exactly one square. Each player
receives a positive payoff (the same for both players and for all assignments) if and only if they both choose exactly the
same assignment. Mehta et al. ﬁnd high rates of coordination in these games. The principles by which players choose
assignments include the rule of closeness, which assigns each circle to the square (if there is one) to which it is closer, and
the rule of accession, which identiﬁes coherent groups of circles and assigns all the circles in such a group to the square that
is closer to the group as a whole. These ﬁndings suggest that people can recognise certain types of salient relations, and
that they can use these relations to identify focal points in matching games. Our experiment was designed to investigate
whether the focal points suggested by these payoff-irrelevant relations might also be used to resolve tacit bargaining
problems.4 Some readers may be surprised that Hume treats ‘Port’ as a product of Spain rather than of Portugal. Perhaps he thought of Port as a type of wine
characteristic of the Iberian peninsula. But whatever one thinks about Hume’s knowledge of wine, there is no difﬁculty in understanding his theoretical
argument.
Fig. 1. Bargaining tables for G1 and G2. (The square on the left was coloured red; the square on the right was coloured blue.)
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To explain the principles of our design, we focus on four basic games. The ﬁrst of these games (‘game G1’) is shown on the left
side of Fig. 1. This diagram was described to subjects as a ‘table’; we will call it a bargaining table. The square on the left side of
the table was coloured red, the square on the right blue. The numbers on the disc represent amounts of money, in UK pounds.5
The instructions were phrased so that they could apply to games (‘scenarios’) with different numbers of discs and
different disc values. The rules of these games were explained as follows:
Each scenario is an interaction between a Red person and a Blue person. Each person has a base, represented by a red
square for the Red person and a blue square for the Blue person. You will discover whether you are Red or Blue at the
end of the instructionsy.
The basic rules.
There are some discs on the table. Each disc has a money value. This is shown on the disc. You and the other person
have the opportunity to agree on a division of the discs.
You and the other person separately record which discs you propose to take. We will say that you are claiming those discs.
You can claim as many (or as few) discs as you want. These claims determine whether there is an agreement or not.
There is an agreement if you have not claimed any of the discs that the other person claimed. That is, you and the other
person claimed different discs. In this case, you get all the discs that are yours according to the agreement. You then
earn the total value of these discs.
But if any disc has been claimed by both you and the other person, there is no agreement. In this case, you get no discs
and so earn nothing.Applied to game G1, these rules deﬁne a game in which each player has four pure strategies, corresponding with the four
subsets of the set of discs on the table. In relation to each player, we (as analysts) can describe the two discs in terms of their
positions relative to that player’s base. For Red (the player whose base is on the left), the £6 disc is ‘near’ and the £5 disc is ‘far’;
for Blue, the £6 disc is ‘far’ and the £5 disc is ‘near’. Then, for each player, the four strategies are: choose none of the discs;
choose the near disc; choose the far disc; and choose both discs. With payoffs represented in UK pounds, the payoff matrix is:5 In the actual display, the disc values were indicated using the £ symbol. InBlueNone Near Far BothNone 0, 0 0, 5 0, 6 0, 11Red Near 6, 0 6, 5 0, 0 0, 0Far 5, 0 0, 0 5, 6 0, 0Both 11, 0 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0This game has ﬁve pure-strategy Nash equilibria—(near, near), (far, far), (both, none), (none, both) and (both, both).
The last three of these are weak equilibria which would be removed by iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies. If
these are eliminated, the essential problem posed by the game is that of reaching a tacit agreement to play one of the two strict
Nash equilibria. The bargaining table format makes the logic of iterated elimination particularly transparent. (Put simply: there
is no point in not claiming any discs; and if you expect the other player to realise this, claiming both discs guarantees that there
will be no agreement.) As we will show in Section 5, dominated strategies were played extremely rarely.
The main objective of our experiment was to investigate how far players are able to resolve problems such as this by
using the relational cues provided by the spatial layout of discs and bases. Our background assumption, made in the light
of Mehta et al.’s (1994a, 1994b) ﬁndings, was that players would perceive the relation of closeness between bases and
discs as highly salient. Given this assumption, Schelling’s theory implies that players in G1 will tend to claim the discs that
are closer to their own bases, inducing a distribution of payoffs that favours Red.the ﬁgure, this symbol is omitted.
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hypothesis. We recognise that the layout of discs on the table might prompt mental associations with real-world situations
in which there are non-strategic reasons for preferring ‘closer’ objects—for example, transport costs which increase with
distance. But, as we noted in the Introduction, mental associations are fundamental to Schelling’s theory. According to
Schelling, what is perceived as the ‘obvious’ outcome of a bargaining problem depends ‘on what analogies or precedents
the deﬁnition of the bargaining issue calls to mind’; the mechanism that lies behind focality is ‘the power of suggestion’
(1960, 69, 73, italics in original). In matching games of the type discussed by Schelling, players often coordinate on labels
that are perceived as ‘favourites’—that is, labels that describe objects or ideas that are evaluated positively (Bardsley et al.,
2010). A particularly relevant example is Schelling’s famous matching game in which the players’ objective was to name
the same meeting place in New York City. Although his respondents clearly knew that they would not really have to go to
the place they named, one factor in making Grand Central Station focal was presumably its convenience as an actual
meeting place for residents of New Haven, Connecticut.
Since Schelling’s theory is about how mental associations affect behaviour in games, a controlled test of the theory can
legitimately use cues that have associations with real-world concepts of value or cost; indeed, a design that eliminated all
such associations might be criticised for lacking external validity. Cues are payoff-irrelevant in the required sense if they
do not provide information about the actual payoffs of the game that is being played, and if this fact is transparent to the
players.6 We see no reason to doubt that our subjects knew how the payoffs of our bargaining table games were
determined. The rules of these games were quite simple; subjects’ understanding of them was checked before the
experiment began, and was reinforced by intuitive visual displays. And we have no reason to believe that subjects thought
the spatial layout of discs on their computer screens conferred real moral entitlements.
To test our background assumption about the salience of the spatial cues in games like G1, our experiment included
some games in which acting on those cues did not require the players to accept arbitrary inequality. Consider G2, shown
on the right of Fig. 1. G2 is exactly the same as G1 except that one of the disc values has been changed from 6 to 5; as a
result, the two strict Nash equilibria of G2 both give payoffs of (5, 5). Intuitively, it seems that if spatial cues will work at all
in bargaining table games, they will do so in a game like G2. We will say that a bargaining table game is equality-compatible
if the discs can be exhaustively divided into two subsets with equal total value. (In other words, an equality-compatible
game has at least two efﬁcient Nash equilibria in which the players’ payoffs are equal.) We will investigate whether
relational cues are as effective in facilitating agreement in equality-incompatible games (such as G1) as in otherwise
similar equality-compatible games (such as G2).
To carry out a controlled test of the hypothesis that relational cues facilitate agreement, we need to compare behaviour
in games in which such cues are present with games in which they are absent. Consider G3, shown in the left of Fig. 2.
The only difference between G3 and G1 is the positioning of the discs on the respective bargaining tables; the discs
themselves are the same in terms of both number and value. Thus, any systematic difference in behaviour between the
two games must be attributable to differences in labelling. Intuitively, G3 lacks salient cues that single out a speciﬁc
division of discs.7 Were G1 to induce more agreement than G3, that would be evidence in support of Schelling’s hypothesis
about the role of payoff-irrelevant cues in tacit bargaining problems. A similar comparison can be made between the
equality-compatible games G2 and G4 (the latter is shown on the right of Fig. 2). G4 differs from G2 only with respect to
the positions of the discs; the relational cue of closeness is present in G2 but absent in G4.
When making such comparisons, our underlying null hypothesis is label invariance—that is, players’ behaviour depends
only on the formal properties of the payoff matrix and is independent of how players and strategies are labelled.
Our alternative hypotheses specify deviations from label invariance in directions implied by Schelling’s theory, given
speciﬁc assumptions about the salience of certain kinds of relational cues.
For the purposes of our tests, we measure the efﬁciency of the outcome of a game as the sum of the players’ payoffs as a
proportion of the total payoff available in the game (11 in G1 and G3, 10 in G2 and G4). This measure can be applied to
games with any number of discs. Where two games differ only with respect to the spatial layout of the discs, label
invariance implies the null hypothesis that, apart from random noise, efﬁciency will be the same in both games. Schelling’s
hypothesis is that efﬁciency will be greater in games with salient relational cues than in games without, and thus greater
in G1 than G3, and greater in G2 than G4. We will assess the power of a given relational cue in a given bargaining table
game by comparing efﬁciency in that game with efﬁciency in an otherwise identical game in which that cue is absent.
Label invariance has a further implication for games (such as G1) that are equality-incompatible and have salient cues.
By making salient a particular division of the discs between the two players, these cues identify one of the players – the6 Payoff irrelevance must hold, not only with respect to traditional game-theoretic assumptions about players’ utility functions but also with respect
to other recognised theories of utility. For example, our objectives would not have been served by adapting the design developed by Roth and Malouf
(1979) and Roth and Murnighan (1982), which investigates the effects on the outcomes of bargaining games of varying information about the
distribution of material payoffs. Nor would it have been appropriate to use a design such as that of Ga¨chter and Riedel (2005), which tests whether
bargaining outcomes are inﬂuenced by players’ perceptions of ‘moral property rights’, induced by relative performance in a general knowledge quiz.
Since attitudes to the distribution of material payoffs and attitudes to rewards for real effort and talent might reasonably be modelled as social
preferences, the information content of the cues used in these designs is potentially payoff-relevant.
7 Or at least, it lacks cues that are as salient as those of G1. It is a logically inescapable feature of the bargaining table design that each disc has a
distinct location, known to both players. Thus, every bargaining table game has spatial cues of some kind. Similarly, in any genuine matching game in
which each player receives the same payoff in every equilibrium, every strategy must have a distinct label (Bardsley et al., 2010, footnote 8).
Fig. 2. Bargaining tables for G3 and G4.
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(In G1, as displayed in Fig. 1, Red – the player on the left – is favoured.) Schelling’s theory implies that, in such games, the
money value of favoured players’ claims will be greater than those of unfavoured players, and that favoured players will
receive higher payoffs. But, since the deﬁnition of ‘favoured’ is a matter of labelling, label invariance implies that there will
be no systematic difference between the claims made by the two players, or between their payoffs.
The four basic games are related to one another in a 22 classiﬁcation scheme, deﬁned by compatibility or
incompatibility with equality and by the presence or absence of a salient relational cue. The 24 games used in the
experiment are related to one another in similar ways. The principles investigated in the basic games are extended in three
different ways.
First, we vary the minimum payoff inequality that is consistent with efﬁcient agreements in equality-incompatible
games. Recall that G1 and G3 use bargaining tables with two discs with the values £6 and £5. We also used two-disc games
(G13 and G15) in which the disc values were £8 and £3, and two-disc games (G14 and G16) in which the values were £10
and £1. Our aim in using these games was to investigate whether the power of relational cues to affect behaviour declines
as the suggested solutions become more unequal.
Second, we vary the number of discs on the table. This allows us to test the robustness of any ﬁndings to variation in the
complexity of the tacit bargaining problems. If results were not robust in this sense, one might reasonably doubt their
external validity in relation to real-world bargaining. In some games (G5–G12), there are four discs; in others (G17–G24),
there are eight. As the number of discs increases, the size of the payoff matrix increases exponentially. Recall that the two-
disc games have 44 payoff matrices. In four-disc games, the corresponding matrices are 1616; in eight-disc games
they are 256256. Viewed in a perspective which takes no account of spatial cues, the equilibrium selection problem
facing the players becomes vastly more difﬁcult as the number of discs increases. Arguably, however, the rule of claiming
the discs that are closer to one’s own base is no less obvious when there are many discs than when there are few.
Third, we investigate the effect of accession as a spatial cue, as well as that of closeness. Since accession involves the
recognition of distinct groups of discs, this cue can be investigated only in games with more than two discs.3. The games used in the experiment
We used 24 games, numbered G1–G24. For each game, we counterbalanced different displays to control for any
systematic effects due to subjects’ perception of the left/right and red/blue distinctions. Appendix A shows the baseline
display of each game, from which the other displays are obtained, as explained later.
Each game is deﬁned by a bargaining table with a 99 grid of squares. To describe locations on any table, we use a
coordinate system in which columns are numbered –4 to 4 from left to right and rows are numbered –4 to 4 from top to
bottom; a location is described by the ordered pair (column number, row number). These column and row numbers, which
were not seen by subjects, are shown along the edges of the tables in Appendix A. To aid the description of the games, each
disc is also given a number (d1, d2,y); again, these were not seen by subjects. In the baseline display of every game, the
Red base is located at (3, 0) and the Blue base at (3, 0).
Every game has two, four, or eight discs, with a total value of either £10 (equality-compatible games) or £11 (equality-
incompatible games). The minimum inequality consistent with efﬁcient agreement can be expressed in terms of the
least-unequal efﬁcient (LUE) distribution.8 In every equality-compatible game, LUE¼5:5. In the equality-incompatible
games, LUE¼10:1 (in G14 and G16), 8:3 (in G13 and G15), or 6:5 (in the other equality-incompatible games).
The 24 games can also be classiﬁed by the nature of their relational cues. In games with a type C cue (the ‘closeness’
games G1, G2, G5, G6, G13, G14, G17 and G18), half the discs are located on the left side of the table (in columns 4, 3,8 For any given bargaining table game, the LUE distribution is deﬁned as the pair of payoffs x1: x2 (where x1 and x2 are the payoffs to the two players
in UK pounds, deﬁned so that x1Zx2) that minimises the value of x1x2 subject to the constraint that every disc is claimed.
Table 1
Summary of experimental design.
LUEa Spatial cueb 2 discs 4 discs 8 discs
5:5 N G4¼95,59 G12¼93,2,2,39 G20¼92,1,1,1,1,1,1,29
5:5 B G10¼9(3,2) (2,3)9 G24¼9(2,1,1,1)(1,1,1,2)9
5:5 C G2¼59 95 G6¼3,29 92,3 G18¼2,1,1,19 91,1,1,2
5:5 A G8¼(392)(293) G22¼(2,1,191)(191,1,2)
6:5 N G3¼96,59 G11¼93,3,2,39 G19¼92,2,1,1,1,1,1,29
6:5 B G9¼9(3,3) (2,3)9 G23¼9(2,2,1,1)(1,1,1,2)9
6:5 C G1¼69 95 G5¼3,39 92,3 G17¼2,2,1,19 91,1,1,2
6:5 A G7¼(393)(293) G21¼(2,2,191)(191,1,2)
8:3 N G15¼98,39
8:3 C G13¼89 93
10:1 N G16¼910,19
10:1 C G14¼109 91
a Least unequal efﬁcient distribution.
b N, neutral; B, blocks; C, closeness; A, accession.
A. Isoni et al. / European Economic Review 59 (2013) 167–188 1732 and 1) and half on the right (in columns 1, 2, 3 and 4). This cue suggests the LUE division in which each player takes
the discs on her side of the table. In equality-incompatible type C games, this division favours one of the players; in the
baseline display, the favoured player is always Red and on the left.
In games with a type A cue (the ‘accession’ games G7, G8, G21 and G22), there are either four or eight discs. These discs
form two distinct blocks comprising equal numbers of contiguous discs. In the ‘left’ block, the most rightward disc is in the
central column; in the ‘right’ block, the most leftward disc is in the central column. This cue suggests the LUE division in
which each player takes the block of discs on her side of the table. In equality-incompatible type A games, this division
favours one of the players; in the baseline display, the favoured player is always Red and on the left.
For each game with a cue of type C or type A, there is a corresponding ‘neutral’ game with the same number of discs and
the same array of disc values, but with a spatial layout which we call a type N cue. In these games, all the discs are in the
central column; either there are no blocks of contiguous discs, or all the discs comprise a single block. The intention was
that these games should lack salient spatial cues. For example, the type N game G11 corresponds with the type C game G5
and the type A game G7; the type N game G20 corresponds with the type C game G18 and the type A game G22.
As an additional control, each game of type A also has a corresponding ‘blocks’ game with a type B cue. These games are
intermediate between type A and type N. All the discs are in the central column, as in a type N game, but they are grouped
into two distinct blocks, as in a type A game. For example, the type B game G24 corresponds with the type A game G22.
It will often be convenient to use a compact notation to describe the main features of the games. This notation is a list of the
discs on the table, identiﬁed by value. Two vertical lines are used to partition this set of discs into those to the left of the central
column, those in the central column, and those on the right. Thus, ‘G5¼3, 39 92, 3’ states that G5 is a type C game in which there
are two discs on the left of the table (d1 and d2), each worth £3, and two discs on the right of the table (d3 and d4), one worth £2
and one worth £3. ‘G12¼93, 2, 2, 39’ states that G12 is a type N game in which there are four discs, all in the central column, two
worth £3 (d1 and d4) and two worth £2 (d2 and d3). Blocks of contiguous discs are identiﬁed by brackets. Thus ‘G8¼(392)(293)’
states that G8 is a type A game in which there are two blocks of two discs each; one block has a disc worth £3 on the left of the
table and a disc worth £2 in the centre; the other block has a disc worth £2 in the centre and a disc worth £3 on the right.
Table 1 uses this notation to summarise the main features of the experimental design. The 24 games are classiﬁed by
LUE (5:5, 6:5, 8:3 or 10:1), by the number of discs (2, 4 or 8), and by the type of spatial cue (N, B, C or A). Our design is
factorial with respect to these three characteristics, subject to the constraint that not all 434¼48 combinations of
these characteristics are feasible. Cues of types B and A are not possible in 2-disc games; there cannot be a 4-disc or 8-disc
game with LUE¼10:1; there cannot be an 8-disc game with LUE¼8:3; and a 4-disc game with LUE¼8:3 would not be
compatible with our system of ‘twinning’ discs, explained below.9
In every equality-compatible game, the layout of discs has a property that ensures that it ‘looks the same’ when viewed
from either base. Our aim in using such layouts was to avoid introducing spatial cues other than closeness and accession
that might induce the players to make unequal claims. Let us say that two discs are twins if their locations are (x, y) and
(x, y); they are identical twins if in addition they have the same value. In equality-compatible games, every disc has an
identical twin.10 (Formally, the bargaining table for each equality-compatible game has two-fold rotational symmetry.)
Each equality-incompatible game can be constructed from a corresponding equality-compatible game by maintaining
the number and spatial layout of the discs and by changing the value either of one disc (when LUE¼6:5) or of two twinned9 A 4-disc game with LUE¼8:3 and a type C cue must take the form 89 91, 1, 1 or 1, 1, 19 98. Since there are more discs on one side of the table than on
the other, this is incompatible with twinning.
10 This characterisation is not completely true of G20. (This minor anomaly arises because we had to ﬁt a block of eight contiguous discs into the nine
rows of the central column.) In this case, and in the corresponding equality-incompatible game G19, we treat the pairs of discs (d1, d8), (d2, d7), (d3, d6)
and (d4, d5) as twins.
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identical. In Appendix A, each equality-compatible game is shown alongside the corresponding equality-incompatible
game for which LUE¼6:5.
To control for any effects due to the left/right and red/blue distinctions, we used four different displays of the set of 24
games. These were constructed by permutations of the baseline display. The red/blue permutation transposes the colours
of the two bases, leaving everything else unchanged. The twin/twin permutation transposes each disc with its twin, leaving
everything else unchanged; in equality-incompatible games with cues of type C or A, this changes which player is favoured
from Left to Right and from Red to Blue, or vice versa. In any given session, each game was displayed in the same way for
all participants.11 Notice that for any given subject, her status as the favoured or unfavoured player was the same in all
games in which there was a favoured/unfavoured distinction. This feature of the design ensures that the use of relational
cues in equality-incompatible games has systematic distributional consequences for each subject, rather than being
beneﬁcial in some games and costly in others.
4. The implementation of the experiment
The experiment was conducted in six sessions at the CBESS Experimental Laboratory at the University of East Anglia.
One hundred subjects were recruited from the general student population using the ORSEE system (Greiner, 2004).
Before the start of the experiment, the instructions were read aloud by an experimenter.12 Participants could follow the
instructions on their screens and could ask questions at any time. The bargaining table, the bases and the discs were
introduced as detailed in Section 2. Participants were told that half of them would play all games as Red and half as Blue;
each Red player had been randomly matched with a Blue player, and this matching would remain anonymous. They were
also told that, for each pair of subjects, the computer had randomly picked one of the 24 games as the one that would
determine those subjects’ earnings, but which game this was would not be revealed until the experiment was over.
Whether a participant was Red or Blue was revealed at the end of the instructions. Bases kept the same colour and position
on the table for all the games.
In each game, the bargaining table was displayed on each player’s screen. Each player could claim discs by clicking on
them with her mouse; at any time, the player’s screen showed the claims she had made, but no information was given about
the other player’s claims. As soon as a player claimed a disc, that disc, originally white, took the same colour as her base, and
a solid line of the same colour connecting the disc to the base appeared on the screen. Any claim could be cancelled by re-
clicking on the relevant disc. Players could change their claims as many times as they wanted until they pressed a ‘submit’
button. While this procedure was being explained, participants could try it on a practice game P¼94,2,19.13
After the rules for determining players’ earnings had been presented, game P was used to illustrate their implications in
three examples depicting an efﬁcient agreement, a failure to agree, and an inefﬁcient agreement respectively. Before the
start of the experiment, participants answered a series of questions to check their understanding of the experimental
procedures. After any remaining questions had been answered, the ﬁrst game appeared on the screen. Participants
proceeded through the 24 games at their own speed, without any feedback between one game and the next.
Each participant played all the games G1–G24 described in Table 1. The games were presented in a random sequence,
which was determined separately for each individual. Since there was no feedback between games and since the game that
would determine earnings for any given pair of subjects had been selected by the computer before any games were played,
the question of how subjects were matched in the other 23 games has no relevance (and indeed no determinate answer).
Subjects were simply advised to ‘treat each scenario [i.e. game] as if it was the real one’ and to ‘think about it in isolation
from the others’. This matching protocol and incentive system ensures that our scenarios are effectively one-shot games,
while eliminating redundant complexity (in the form of ‘information’ about hypothetical and irrelevant matchings) from
the instructions.
After every participant had completed all the games, payments were determined according to the decisions made by each
pair of subjects in the ‘real’ scenario. In addition, subjects received a £5 show-up fee. The average earning was £6.93.14
5. Results
Table 2 gives an overview of behaviour in the experiment. It shows the distribution of claims by total value in each
game. For equality-incompatible games of types C and A, distributions are reported separately for favoured and11 The favoured player was Red in three of the six sessions and Blue in the others, and similarly for Left and Right. These permutations are described
in more detail in Appendix B, Section B.1.
12 The full text of the instructions can be found in Appendix B, Section B.3.
13 According to the classiﬁcation of spatial layouts presented in the previous section, P is an N game. Before the start of the experiment proper, when
we needed to illustrate the rules of the game or test participants’ understanding of those rules, we only used N games with an odd number of discs. This
was done in order to avoid inadvertently suggesting the use of the spatial cues we were interested in studying.
14 If in every game, every pair of co-players had agreed on an efﬁcient division of the discs, average earnings from the real scenario would have been
£5.29, compared with the actual average of £1.93. To put this comparison into perspective, it should be remembered that half of the games were of either
the N or the B type, which present enormous coordination challenges to the players.
Table 2
Distribution of claim values by game.
Game description Fav/unfav Mean Med. Std. dev.
Claim value
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
G1¼69 95 Fav 5.62 6 0.92 1 – – – – 13 36 – – – – 0
Unfav 5.18 5 0.39 0 – – – – 41 9 – – – – 0
G2¼59 95 4.95 5 0.50 1 – – – – 99 – – – – 0 –
G3¼96,59 5.47 5 0.50 0 – – – – 53 47 – – – – 0
G4¼95,59 5.00 5 0.00 0 – – – – 100 – – – – 0 –
G5¼3,39 92,3 Fav 4.78 6 1.63 0 – 5 13 – 4 27 – 1 0 – 0
Unfav 4.78 5 1.30 0 – 1 11 – 29 7 – 1 1 – 0
G6¼3,29 92,3 4.51 5 1.31 0 – 7 19 2 68 2 0 0 – 2 –
G7¼(393)(293) Fav 4.88 5 1.60 0 – 3 10 – 21 14 – 1 0 – 1
Unfav 4.70 5 1.63 0 – 4 10 – 27 7 – 0 1 – 1
G8¼(392)(293) 4.37 5 1.24 0 – 12 17 1 65 3 1 1 – – –
G9¼9(3,3) (2,3)9 4.64 5 1.45 0 – 5 28 – 37 29 – 0 0 – 1
G10¼9(3,2) (2,3)9 4.49 5 1.21 0 – 7 18 4 66 3 1 0 – 1 –
G11¼93,3,2,39 4.78 5 1.40 0 – 5 22 – 44 26 – 1 2 – 0
G12¼93,2,2,39 4.21 5 1.27 1 – 13 18 3 61 4 0 0 – 0 –
G13¼89 93 Fav 6.46 8 2.43 0 – – 16 – – – – 33 – – 1
Unfav 5.16 3 2.60 0 – – 29 – – – – 20 – – 1
G14¼109 91 Fav 8.42 10 3.52 0 9 – – – – – – – – 39 2
Unfav 6.56 10 4.44 1 18 – – – – – – – – 31 0
G15¼98,39 5.90 8 2.58 1 – – 41 – – – – 57 – – 1
G16¼910,19 7.84 10 3.92 2 22 – – – – – – – – 74 2
G17¼2,2,1,19 91,1,1,2 Fav 4.72 5 1.44 0 2 3 3 12 10 19 1 0 0 0 0
Unfav 4.46 5 1.31 0 3 2 4 6 32 2 0 1 0 0 0
G18¼2,1,1,19 91,1,1,2 4.31 5 1.29 0 5 5 9 24 53 3 0 0 0 1 –
G19¼92,2,1,1,1,1,1,29 4.30 4 1.41 0 4 8 13 26 31 15 2 1 0 0 0
G20¼92,1,1,1,1,1,1,29 3.95 4 1.33 0 5 12 17 21 40 4 1 0 0 0 –
G21¼(2,2,191)(191,1,2) Fav 4.58 5 1.62 0 2 5 6 8 9 19 0 1 0 0 0
Unfav 4.36 5 1.26 0 2 4 6 3 32 3 0 0 0 0 0
G22¼(2,1,191)(191,1,2) 4.21 5 1.34 0 6 11 8 9 63 3 0 0 0 0 –
G23¼9(2,2,1,1)(1,1,1,2)9 4.10 5 1.35 0 7 8 15 13 52 5 0 0 0 0 0
G24¼9(2,1,1,1)(1,1,1,2)9 4.23 5 1.28 0 5 6 14 19 50 4 2 0 0 0 –
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extremely rare for players either to claim none of the discs (averaging over all 24 games, this occurs in 0.3% of cases) or to
claim all of them (0.6% of cases). In other words, iteratively dominated strategies were almost never played.
5.1. The spatial distribution of claims
We now consider whether the relational cues provided by the spatial layout of discs on the bargaining table had any
inﬂuence on the claims that participants made.
Table 3 and 4 describe subjects’ claims in terms of disc location. Table 3 refers to C and A games. In each C game, there is
no more than one disc in each column of the bargaining table, and so each disc location is uniquely identiﬁed by the
number (4,y, 1, 1,y, 4) of the column in which it appears. In A games, there are two discs in the central column, but
all discs are either in row 2 or in row 2. In order to ensure that no more than one disc is assigned to any cell of the table,
Table 3
Spatial distribution of claims in C and A games.
Game
Column coordinate
–4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4
G1¼69 95 76:20 24:78
G2¼59 95 94:10 6:88
G5¼3,39 92,3 80:10 62:26 16:66 16:70
G6¼3,29 92,3 84:12 80:10 6:70 8:86
G7¼(393)(293) [Row –2] 68:20 44:34
[Row 2] 48:60 20:64
G8¼(392)(293) [Row –2] 74:18 48:18
[Row 2] 38:60 16:74
G13¼89 93 66:40 36:62
G14¼109 91 66:50 34:52
G17¼2,2,1,19 91,1,1,2 82:16 78:20 82:8 64:14 8:54 8:66 4:66 6:84
G18¼2,1,1,19 91,1,1,2 82:14 86:20 84:14 68:10 4:48 6:66 12:72 8:78
G21¼(2,2,191)(191,1,2) [Row –2] 76:14 66:12 72:10 64:10
[Row 2] 20:56 12:66 14:68 12:74
G22¼(2,1,191)(191,1,2) [Row –2] 78:12 82:10 70:4 78:6
[Row 2] 12:62 8:78 6:74 8:78
Average claims by Left (%) 82 78 76 69 44 11 9 16 7
Average claims by Right (%) 15 21 13 13 38 64 68 73 81
Table 4
Spatial distribution of claims in N and B games.
Game
Row coordinate
4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4
G3¼96,59 46:40 54:60
G4¼95,59 42:30 58:70
G9¼9(3,3) (2,3)9 44:22 46:26 40:54 40:66
G10¼9(3,2) (2,3)9 42:38 46:26 44:54 50:56
G11¼93,3,2,39 52:30 36:26 46:56 52:54
G12¼93,2,2,39 38:22 42:24 42:52 46:68
G15¼98,39 42:44 60:54
G16¼910,19 44:44 60:52
G19¼92,2,1,1,1,1,1,29 35:19 36:28 34:32 38:24 28:30 32:48 48:50 50:58 38:63
G20¼92,1,1,1,1,1,1,29 50:27 46:20 42:32 36:14 20:34 42:46 50:60 46:54 50:58
G23¼9(2,2,1,1)(1,1,1,2)9 36:20 42:24 38:18 34:18 34:62 42:54 44:62 54:64
G24¼9(2,1,1,1)(1,1,1,2)9 50:32 52:28 34:20 30:16 34:50 38:52 40:60 52:62
Average claims by Left (%) 43 44 40 36 24 38 44 50 48
Average claims by Right (%) 25 31 26 20 32 52 54 60 62
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claimed that disc, followed by the corresponding percentage of Right players. For example, the entry for ‘column
coordinate –3’ for game G1 reports that, aggregating over the 50 cases in which this game was played, the disc located at
(3, 2) was claimed by the Left player in 38 cases (76%) and by the Right player in 10 cases (20%). In equality-
incompatible games, these percentages aggregate over cases in which Left was favoured and in which Right was favoured;
because of counterbalancing, a signiﬁcant difference between the two percentages indicates an effect of disc location.
Table 4 provides analogous information for N and B games. In each of these games, all discs are in the central column of the
bargaining table, and so each disc location is uniquely identiﬁed by the number (4,y, 4) of the row in which it appears.
Table 3 reveals a very strong spatial pattern which tends to facilitate agreement: the own side effect. We deﬁne the left
side of the table as columns 4,y, 1 and the right side as columns 1,y, 4. The own side effect is a tendency for both Left
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other side. On the left side of the table, Left players claim discs with average frequencies ranging from 69 to 82%, while
Right players claim the same discs in just 13–21% of the cases. The pattern is reversed on the right side, where average
frequencies are between 7 and 16% for Left players and between 64 and 81% for Right players. The sharp discontinuity in
these frequencies at the centre of the table – a discontinuity that occurs in every game in which there are discs on both
sides of the table – suggests that the central column was perceived as a boundary, analogous with the river in Schelling’s
army commanders game. That is, players were not merely revealing an unconscious bias towards choosing closer objects;
they were using the distinction between the left and right sides of the table as a coordinating device.
We conduct a statistical test for the own side effect in the following way. For each player, we construct a new variable,
diffLR, deﬁned as the difference between the total number of claims the player made on the left side and the total number
of claims he/she made on the right side, aggregating over all C and A games. In the absence of an own side effect (or its
opposite), the distribution of diffLR should not differ systematically between Left and Right players. To the contrary, the
average for the 50 Left players is 15.22, while that for the 50 Right players is –12.88. This difference is overwhelmingly
signiﬁcant (po0.001) in a two-tail Mann–Whitney test.
Table 3 also shows an accession effect in the four A games (G7, G8, G21 and G22). Remember that in each of these games,
the disc in row –2 of the central column is part of the ‘left’ block, while the disc in row 2 is part of the ‘right’ block. There is
a clear tendency for the former disc to be chosen more frequently by Left players than by Right players, and conversely for
the latter. For each disc in the central column of each of these games, we conduct a w2 test of the hypothesis that the
probability of that disc being claimed is independent of the position of the claimant’s base. We ﬁnd a statistically
signiﬁcant effect (po0.05) in six of the eight cases, with po0.001 in all cases involving eight-disc games.15
Table 4 reveals two spatial patterns in the claims made in N and B games. The top-left/bottom-right effect is a tendency
for Left players to choose discs in the top four cells of the central column more frequently than Right players, and an
opposite tendency for discs in the bottom four cells (see the last two rows of Table 4).16 We conduct a test which is similar
in spirit to our test of the own side effect. Summing over all B and N games, let diffTB indicate the difference between the
total number of claims that a player made in the top rows of the central column and the total number of claims he/she
made in the bottom rows.17 Absent any top-left/bottom-right effect (or its opposite), the distribution of diffTB should not
differ systematically between Left and Right players. We ﬁnd that the average is 1.28 for Left players and 8.14 for Right
players. The difference is signiﬁcant (po0.05) in a two-tail Mann–Whitney test.
That the average of diffTB is negative for both Left and Right players is indicative of the second spatial pattern in N and B
claims: bottom bias. This is the tendency, other things being equal, for both players to make more claims in the bottom cells
of the central column than in the top cells. Aggregating over Left and Right players, discs in the top four cells of that
column are claimed in 33.9% of cases, while the corresponding ﬁgure for the bottom four cells is 51.5%. Our statistical test
compares the proportion of subjects making the majority of their claims in the top cells with the corresponding proportion
for the bottom cells. There are 36 subjects who make more claims at the top and 59 who make more at the bottom. The
difference is signiﬁcant (po0.05) in a two-tail binomial test.18
The top-left/bottom-right and bottom bias effects are contrary to our prior expectation that type N games would lack
salient spatial cues. However, as will emerge later, the spatial cues in these games generally did not do much to facilitate
agreement. This is probably because the two effects (which in any case are weaker than the own-side effect) tend to offset
one another: the top-left/bottom-right effect facilitates agreement, while bottom bias works in the opposite direction.
At this point it is convenient to mention two other cues that are present in all our games. In every game, one player has
the role of Left and the other that of Right; and one has the role of Red and the other that of Blue. It is conceivable that,
quite apart from the three spatial effects we have considered, subjects might perceive these cues as suggesting that one
role had priority over the other in the division of the discs. We therefore investigated whether, after controlling for the
difference between favoured and unfavoured players, the position or colour of players’ bases affected either the total value
of the claims they made or their expected payoffs from the game. We found no systematic effects of any of these kinds.195.2. The power of relational cues in the basic games
In this subsection we look at behaviour in the four games (G1–G4) that we discussed in detail in Section 3. Recall that
this is a set of two-disc games in which LUE is either 5:5 or 6:5. Cues are of types C and N.
When testing hypotheses about efﬁciency, we will use a measure of standardised efﬁciency, computed in a way that
abstracts from the arbitrariness of the actual pairing of co-players. For each Left (Right) player, we compute an expected
payoff as the average of the earnings the player would receive if paired, in turn, with each of the Right (Left) players who15 The only cases in which the null hypothesis cannot be rejected are those involving the two discs in the central column of G7.
16 An analogous but relatively weak effect in assignment games is reported by Mehta et al. (1994b, p. 182).
17 This aggregation is legitimate because the discs in the top and bottom rows of the central column are twins. (Because of counterbalancing, the
anomalous features of G19 and G20 do not compromise the aggregation.)
18 Again, this aggregation is legitimate because the relevant discs are twins.
19 The regression analyses we carried out are reported in Appendix B, Tables B2 and B3. Expected payoffs were calculated using the method of
‘legitimate matching’ explained in Section 5.2.
Table 5
Efﬁciency and distribution in 2-disc games.
5:5 6:5 8:3 10:1
Game description
N G4¼95,59 G3¼96,59 G15¼98,39 G16¼910,19
C G2¼59 95 G1¼69 95 G13¼89 93 G14¼109 91
Benchmarks (%)
Nash efﬁciency 50.0 49.6 39.7 16.5
Blind efﬁciency 50.0 50.3 48.3 35.8
Standardised efﬁciency (%)
N 46.7 48.6 45.7 35.0
C 84.4 64.8 51.4 36.9
Power of relational cuesa
C 1.80*** 1.33*** 1.12* 1.06
Average claims fav/unfavb
C n/a 1.08*** 1.25** 1.28**
Expected earnings fav/unfavb
C n/a 1.13*** 1.57** 2.43***
N, neutral; C closeness.
a Standardised efﬁciency in C as proportion of standardised efﬁciency in N. Asterisks show signiﬁcance in two-tail Wilcoxon signed-rank tests on
expected payoffs: *10%, **5%, ***1%.
b Ratio of average claims (expected earnings) of favoured players to average claims (expected earnings) of unfavoured players. Asterisks show
signiﬁcance in two-tail Mann–Whitney rank-sum tests on claims (expected earnings): *10%, **5%, ***1%.
A. Isoni et al. / European Economic Review 59 (2013) 167–188178encountered the games in exactly the same display (i.e. those for whom the red/blue and twin/twin permutations were the
same). We will refer to these pairings as legitimate matchings.20 For any game, standardised efﬁciency is the average of
these expected payoffs computed across all participants in both roles, divided by the total value of the discs in the game
(10 in equality-compatible games, 11 in equality-incompatible games). The data for all 2-disc games are reported in
Table 5; for the purposes of this subsection, only the ﬁrst two columns are relevant. The ﬁrst two rows of the table describe
the relevant games C and N games in our compact notation. The third row reports, as a benchmark, the Nash efﬁciency of
the game—that is, the proportion of the total value of the discs that players would earn by using the mixed-strategy Nash
equilibrium. Notice that Nash efﬁciency is independent of spatial cues.
The fourth row reports another benchmark. Given our unexpected ﬁnding that players responded to spatial cues even
in the N games that were intended as ‘neutral’, it is useful to have some idea of how far (if at all) efﬁciency in those games
was attributable to such cues. For each player in any given N game, we can construct a counterfactual mixed strategy in
which she claims the same total value of discs as she actually claimed, but randomises over the different sets of discs that
sum to that value (as if she were unable to see any spatial cues). Blind efﬁciency is the expected value of efﬁciency that
would result from such play if every subject were matched with every other. Intuitively, this measure is an attempt to
remove any residual effects of spatial cues from N-game data.21
The ﬁfth and sixth rows of the table report standardised efﬁciency in N and C games. The seventh row shows efﬁciency
in each C game as a proportion of that in the corresponding N game: this is our measure of the power of the closeness cue.
The asterisks against these measures report tests of the null hypothesis that expected earnings are equal in the two
versions of the game, against the alternative that earnings are different. As we explained, Schelling’s hypothesis implies
that earnings are higher in C games. These comparisons are based on two-tail Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. For equality-
incompatible C games, the remaining two rows report information about the behaviour of favoured and unfavoured
players. The ﬁrst of these rows reports the ratio between the average value of the claims made by the favoured players
and the corresponding average for unfavoured players. The last row contains analogous ratios for expected payoffs.
The asterisks against these ratios show the results of two-tail Mann–Whitney tests of the null hypotheses that favoured
and unfavoured players do not differ with respect to claims and expected earnings.22
First, notice that in every two-disc N game, the difference between standardised efﬁciency and blind efﬁciency is very
small. The implication is that subjects’ use of spatial cues in these games had at most only a marginal effect on efﬁciency.20 The only information that a participant was given about her co-player was that the latter was seeing exactly the same display but was taking the
other role (i.e. Left if the ﬁrst player was Right, and vice versa). Any pairing of Left and Right players who saw the same display is consistent with this
information.
21 Because this measure is intended to remove all visual effects, it does not use the ‘legitimate matching’ procedure. Thus, its deﬁnition differs from
that of standardised efﬁciency even in a game in which no two discs have the same value. In G3, for example, if every Left player claimed the top disc and
every Right player claimed the bottom disc, standardised efﬁciency would be 100%, but blind efﬁciency would be only 50% (since the £5 and £6 discs
would have been chosen with equal overall frequency).
22 We use two-tail tests here for consistency with the rest of our analysis. Since Schelling’s hypothesis singles out a one-sided alternative, our tests
are particularly conservative.
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divisions are possible. Comparing the two equality-compatible games, standardised efﬁciency is 46.7% in the N game (G4),
just less than the Nash efﬁciency benchmark, but is 84.4% in the C game (G2); the difference is strongly signiﬁcant (po0.01).
Do closeness cues retain their power in the 6:5 equality-incompatible game? In the N game (G3), efﬁciency is 48.6%,
again very close to the Nash benchmark. In the C game (G1), it is signiﬁcantly greater (po0.01) at 64.8%. The power of
closeness cues is not as dramatic as in the equality-compatible games, but the extent to which players use them to reach
agreement in the C game is still substantial (36 out of 50 favoured players, and 41 out of 50 unfavoured players, claimed
just the disc closer to them—see Table 2).
We now consider whether, in the equality-incompatible C game, favoured players made larger claims than unfavoured,
and whether the former received higher payoffs. In relation to two-disc games, these questions are almost equivalent (they
would be exactly equivalent if every player claimed exactly one disc and if every favoured player was matched with every
unfavoured player in the computation of expected earnings); but they have distinct content in four- and eight-disc games. If
Schelling’s hypothesis is correct, favoured players should claim more and have higher expected earnings. Here the evidence
of distributional effects is very clear. In G1, favoured players make larger claims than unfavoured players, and the difference
is strongly signiﬁcant (po0.01).23 Correspondingly, expected payoffs are signiﬁcantly higher for favoured players.
5.3. Increasing the inequality of the LUE distribution
As Table 5 shows, the power of closeness cues declines as the LUE distribution becomes more unequal. When LUE¼8:3,
the increase in efﬁciency attributable to closeness cues is modest, although still signiﬁcant at the 10% level. When
LUE¼10:1, closeness cues have no signiﬁcant effect. Interestingly, in the N versions of the equality-incompatible 8:3 and
10:1 games, efﬁciency is markedly greater than the corresponding Nash benchmarks. The blind efﬁciency measures show
that this is not due to the use of spatial cues in the N games. The explanation is that subjects claimed the less valuable disc
more frequently than Nash equilibrium prescribes. If each player claims exactly one disc, randomising between the higher-
and lower-valued discs without taking account of their spatial positions, efﬁciency is maximised if each disc is claimed
with equal probability. It can be calculated from Table 2 that the proportion of subjects claiming only the less valuable disc
was 0.41 in G15 and 0.22 in G16, compared with Nash equilibrium probabilities of 0.27 and 0.09.24
However, closeness cues have signiﬁcant distributional effects in both the 8:3 and 10:1 games. These effects become stronger
as asymmetry increases: the ratio between the expected payoffs of favoured and unfavoured players increases from 1.1 in the 6:5
game to 2.4 in the 10:1 game. The implication is that relational cues have some signiﬁcant effect in all the 2-disc games; as the
inequality of the LUE distribution increases, efﬁciency effects become weaker but distributional effects become stronger.
5.4. Increasing the number of discs
Efﬁciency and distribution data for four- and eight-disc games are reported in Table 6. The format is similar to that of Table 5,
but as these games have many mixed-strategy Nash equilibria, no Nash efﬁciency benchmark is shown. Table 6 also reports the
standardised agreement rate for each game. Recall that two players are deemed to reach an agreement if no disc is claimed by both
of them. The standardised agreement rate is the expected proportion of games that end in agreement; it is calculated by averaging
over legitimate pairings of subjects, in the same way as in the calculation of standardised efﬁciency. Since a game can lead to
positive payoffs only if there is an agreement, the agreement rate cannot be less than the efﬁciency measure. However, there can
be agreements in which some discs are claimed by neither player; in four- and eight-disc games, such inefﬁcient agreements can
give positive payoffs to both players and do not require the use of iteratively dominated strategies.
In these games, there are four types of spatial layout (N, B, C and A); LUE is either 5:5 or 6:5. Recall that the difference
between B games and N games is that, in the former, the discs (all of which are in the central column in both cases) are
grouped into two blocks. In principle, this could facilitate agreement by inducing players to make all their claims from one
block. In fact, we found a slight tendency in this direction for equality-incompatible games, but not for equality-
compatible games.25 As Table 6 shows, except in the equality-incompatible four-disc game, efﬁciency was only slightly
greater in B games than in N games. From now on, in the interests of brevity and clarity, we will focus on N, C and A games.
In all four N games, efﬁciency was relatively low (between 18.5 and 32.0%) and was lower in eight-disc games than in
four-disc games. This is perhaps not surprising, given the difﬁculty of avoiding disagreement when there are many discs on
the table. Indeed, one might be surprised that efﬁciency in these games was as high as it was. For example, in the equality-
compatible eight-disc game (G20), if both players claimed discs worth £5, and if each player randomised between the 52
different sets of claims that have this property, standardised efﬁciency would be only 1.9%. The main reason why such23 These ﬁndings are conﬁrmed by a regression analysis which controls for the effects of the colour and position of players’ bases, and for colour/
position interactions (see Appendix B, Table B3).
24 These probabilities are calculated assuming risk neutrality. If players are sufﬁciently risk-averse, observed behaviour in G15 and G16 may be
consistent with Nash equilibrium.
25 In one pair of corresponding B and N games (G9, G11), we found that B cues had a strong effect in inducing players to make all claims from one
block; we found an analogous, but weaker, effect in the same direction in another pair (G23, G19) and no effect in either direction in the pairs (G10, G12)
and (G24, G20): see Appendix B, Table B1.
Table 6
Efﬁciency and distribution in 4-disc and 8-disc games.
4 discs 8 discs
5:5 6:5 5:5 6:5
Game description
N G12¼93,2,2,39 G11¼93,3,2,39 G20¼92,1,1,1,1,1,1,29 G19¼92,2,1,1,1,1,1,29
B G10¼9(3,2) (2,3)9 G9¼9(3,3) (2,3)9 G24¼9(2,1,1,1)(1,1,1,2)9 G23¼9(2,2,1,1)(1,1,1,2)9
C G6¼3,29 92,3 G5¼3,39 92,3 G18¼2,1,1,19 91,1,1,2 G17¼2,2,1,19 91,1,1,2
A G8¼(392)(293) G7¼(393)(293) G22¼(2,1,191)(191,1,2) G21¼(2,2,191)(191,1,2)
Benchmark (%)
Blind efﬁciency 30.0 25.3 12.4 12.1
Standardised efﬁciency (%)
N 32.0 23.8 22.0 18.5
B 33.3 35.2 22.0 22.1
C 65.8 53.4 52.9 51.8
A 41.1 32.5 58.7 46.7
Standardised agreement rate (%)
N 41.5 30.7 29.9 27.0
B 39.8 44.8 28.0 32.2
C 74.9 62.8 63.4 62.2
A 49.3 40.2 68.3 57.4
Power of relational cuesa
C 2.06*** 2.24*** 2.40*** 2.80***
A 1.28*** 1.37*** 2.67*** 2.53***
Average claims fav/unfavb
C n/a 1.00 n/a 1.06
A n/a 1.04 n/a 1.05
Expected earnings fav/unfavb
C n/a 1.04 n/a 1.08
A n/a 1.08 n/a 1.12
N, neutral; B, blocks; C, closeness; A, accession.
a Standardised efﬁciency in C or A as proportion of standardised efﬁciency in N. Asterisks show signiﬁcance in two-tail Wilcoxon signed-rank tests on
expected payoffs: *10%, **5%, ***1%.
b Ratio of average claims (expected earnings) of favoured players to average claims (expected earnings) of unfavoured players. Asterisks show
signiﬁcance in two-tail Mann–Whitney rank-sum tests on claims (expected earnings): *10%, **5%, ***1%.
A. Isoni et al. / European Economic Review 59 (2013) 167–188180extreme inefﬁciency did not materialise was that many subjects played safe by claiming less than £5. That subjects
behaved in this way is indicated by the fact that agreement rates are higher than corresponding efﬁciency measures; more
direct evidence can be found in Table 2. In the eight-disc N games, an additional causal factor may have been at work. In
these games, standardised efﬁciency is somewhat greater than blind efﬁciency, suggesting that players made some use of
the spatial layout of discs to facilitate coordination.
In all four C games, efﬁciency is more than twice as high as in the corresponding N games; in each case, the difference is
signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Clearly, the rule of closeness is a powerful focal point in all these games. If the power of a spatial
cue is measured by the relative change in efﬁciency attributable to its presence, closeness cues seem to be no less powerful
in the equality-incompatible games than the equality-compatible ones. Although levels of efﬁciency fall off as complexity
increases, closeness cues seem to become more powerful.
As in the N games, agreement rates in the C games are markedly higher than the corresponding efﬁciency measures.
This reﬂects the fact that many players did not claim all the discs that, according to the spatial cues, were ‘theirs’. For
example, consider G18. In this equality-compatible eight-disc C game, standardised efﬁciency is 51.8%, while the
standardised agreement rate is 62.2%. Table 2 shows that 43 of the 100 players of this game claimed discs worth less
than £5, while only four claimed discs worth more than £5. It is natural to ask whether players made use of closeness cues
in deciding which of ‘their’ discs to claim. The data in Table 3 suggest that they did. In G18, for example, 41 of the 50 Left
players claimed the £1 disc in column 4 (disc d3), while only 34 chose the £1 disc in column –1 (disc d2); similarly, 39
Right players claimed the £1 disc in column 4 (disc d6), while only 24 chose the £1 disc in column 1 (disc d7).
The A games show qualitatively similar effects to those found in the C games. In all four A games, efﬁciency is greater
than in the corresponding N games, and in each case the difference is signiﬁcant at the 1% level. However, the accession
cues are more powerful in the eight-disc games (where their effect on efﬁciency is similar to that of the closeness cues)
than in the four-disc games. This difference can also be observed in the spatial distributions of the claims of Left and Right
players in A games (see Table 3): left/right asymmetries in central-column claims are more pronounced in eight-disc
games. Intuitively, this difference seems to reﬂect the relative salience of the accession cues in the two cases: if one looks
at the displays of the A games (see Appendix A), it is immediately obvious that the two blocks appear much closer to the
bases in G21and G22 than in G7 and G8).
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In three out of four of the relevant C and A games with four and eight discs, favoured players claim more than unfavoured
players, and in all of them they have higher expected payoffs, but these effects are never signiﬁcant. There is a suggestive
parallel here with the observation that, in the context of efﬁciency comparisons, the differences between equality-
compatible and equality-incompatible games become less sharp as the number of discs increases. It seems that, as the
number of discs increases, the issue of whether the total value of the discs can be divided equally between the two players
becomes less salient. This is perhaps connected with the tendency for players of four- and eight-disc games to claim less
than half the total value of the discs on the table. For a player who expects some discs to remain unclaimed, it may seem
immaterial to ask whether or not the total value of the discs can be divided equally.
5.5. The effect of experience
Since no feedback was provided between scenarios, and since subjects were paid only for one of them, each of our
scenarios can be regarded as a one-shot game. However, subjects may have become more conscious of labelling cues as the
experiment progressed. To test for this possibility, we investigated whether there were systematic changes in subjects’
behaviour over the course of the experiment. For each game, we investigated whether behaviour in that game differed
according to its location in the sequence of scenarios. We found no systematic effects for two-disc games, but for four- and
eight-disc games with relational cues there was some tendency for expected payoffs to increase over the course of the
experiment.26 It seems that experience of playing two-disc games may have helped subjects to recognise relational cues in
more complex games.
6. Is tacit bargaining different from matching?
The results reported in Section 5 show that label invariance fails in both equality-compatible and equality-incompatible
bargaining table games. The nature of this failure is as predicted by Schelling’s theory of the role of focal points in tacit
bargaining. That is, labelling cues that suggest relations between speciﬁc objects and speciﬁc players tend to increase
efﬁciency and, where those cues suggest unequal distributions, to induce corresponding inequalities in both claims and
payoffs. The relative strength of the efﬁciency and distributional effects of labelling cues varies between the games we
have studied, but in all the games in which there are cues of accession or closeness, at least one of those effects is
signiﬁcant.
It is perhaps not particularly surprising that, in equality-compatible games, relational cues that point to equal and
efﬁcient solutions are powerful focal points. It is well established that, in bargaining games in which there is exactly one
outcome that gives an equal and efﬁcient division of monetary payoffs, players who are able to communicate with one
another tend to agree on that outcome (e.g. Nydegger and Owen, 1975; Roth and Malouf, 1979; Roth and Murnighan,
1982). One might therefore have expected that, in our bargaining table games, salient payoff-irrelevant cues would
be used to select among equal and efﬁcient equilibria. Our key result is that such cues are also effective in equality-
incompatible games.
This ﬁnding is at odds with the interpretation that Crawford et al. (2008) give to the results of their investigation
of asymmetric matching games—that ‘minute payoff asymmetry’ can cause focal points to lose their power (see Introduction).
It seems that there must be some difference between our bargaining table games and Crawford et al.’s asymmetric
matching games that makes focal points more powerful in the former.
One possibility is that the difference is attributable to framing or labelling. In Crawford et al.’s experiment, games were
framed as matching problems (subjects were told ‘It is in the interest of both players to match one another’s choices’).
Payoff-irrelevant cues took the form of labels (for example ‘X’ and ‘Y’, where ‘X’ was expected to be more salient) attached
to matching pairs of choices. Coordination occurred if the two players chose strategies with the same label. In our
experiment, in contrast, games were framed as bargaining problems in which subjects were trying to ‘agree on a division of
the discs’. Payoff-irrelevant cues took the form of salient relations between claimants and claimable objects. Coordination
occurred if the players claimed different discs. We suggest that the matching logic of Crawford et al.’s design may prompt
players to think of their problem as that of coordinating on a particular distribution of payoffs, thereby foregrounding the
conﬂict of interest in an asymmetric game. The bargaining logic of our design has a different emphasis. Our players do not
have to specify what their co-players are to get, but only what they want to get for themselves. Thus, each player’s
attention is directed towards his or her own claims and potential payoffs, rather than towards the distribution of payoffs
between the two players.26 For each game we compared the average expected payoff when the game was played in the ﬁrst half of the experiment (scenarios 1–12) and when
it was played in the second half (scenarios 13–24). Expected payoffs were calculated using the legitimate matching procedure (described in Section 5.2)
separately for participants who played the game in each half of the experiment. We found no signiﬁcant increases in efﬁciency for any 2-disc game. There
were signiﬁcant increases in ﬁve out of the eight C and A 4- and 8-disc games. In principle, similar comparisons can be made between average expected
payoffs for games played in scenario 1 (i.e. by subjects who had had no opportunities for learning) and in the experiment as a whole. These data do not
show any obvious learning effects, but there are too few scenario 1 observations for meaningful statistical tests. Our tests for the effects of repetition are
detailed in Appendix B, Section B.2.
A. Isoni et al. / European Economic Review 59 (2013) 167–188182An alternative (or complementary) possibility is that the difference is attributable to the formal structures of the
relevant games. Crawford et al.’s matching games have 22 payoff matrices. Recall that the payoff matrices for our games
are 44, 1616, or 256256. The level-k model that Crawford et al. use to explain their observations assumes that,
in choosing their strategies, players at ‘level 1’ and above reason about best responses to possible strategy choices by their
co-players; in addition, players at level 2 and above attribute best-response reasoning to their co-players; and so on.
Clearly, the cognitive demands of this kind of iterated best-response reasoning increase with the number of strategies in a
game. In contrast, as we noted in Section 2, the same is not true of the reasoning involved in resolving equilibrium
selection problems by using spatial cues. Recall that, in our experiment, focal points become more powerful as the number
of discs on the table increases (see Section 5.4). So perhaps the crucial difference between our design and Crawford et al.’s
is on the dimension of strategic complexity.
In order to disentangle these two possibilities, we conducted the following additional experiment.27 For each of our
eight two-disc games, we ran a bargaining table treatment in which each player was required to claim one and only one
disc. The procedures were kept as similar as possible to those of the original study, with each participant playing the eight
games in random order with no feedback. The ‘basic rules’ in terms of which the games were described were essentially
the same as those reproduced in Section 2, except for some substitutions of singulars for plurals and the following two
changes. ‘You can claim as many (or as few) discs as you want’ was replaced by: ‘You must claim one and only one disc’.
‘There is an agreement ify’ was reworded as: ‘There is an agreement if you and the other person claimed different discs.
In this case, you get the disc that is yours according to the agreement. You then earn the value of that disc. But if you and
the other person have both claimed the same disc, there is no agreement. In this case, you get no disc and so earn
nothing.’28 This treatment preserves the bargaining table format of the original experiment but converts the original 44
games into their 22 counterparts by removing iteratively dominated strategies.
The results of the 22 treatment are reported in Table 7, in the same format as those for the 2-disc games in the
original experiment. In addition, immediately after the description of the games in compact notation, we provide some
extra data to summarise the claims made in the experiment. For each C game, we report the percentage of the 100
participants who claimed the disc closer to their base. The asterisks next to the percentages indicate signiﬁcance in a
binomial test of the hypothesis that both discs were equally likely to be claimed. The next two percentages refer to
favoured and unfavoured players respectively. Finally, for the six equality-incompatible games, we report the percentages
of players who claimed the more valuable disc.
Overall, behaviour in the 22 bargaining table treatment is intermediate between that in the original 44 treatment
and that in Crawford et al.’s experiment. The 22 data show qualitative patterns similar to those in the 44 data. In the
equality-compatible game (G2), and in the equality-incompatible game with the smallest payoff inequality (G1), the closer
disc is signiﬁcantly more likely to be claimed than the less close disc. These effects are signiﬁcant at the 1 and 5% level
respectively, but vanish in G13 and G14, in which the LUE distribution is more unequal. In the latter games, most players
claimed the more valuable disc, irrespective of the presence or absence of spatial cues.
Even in cases in which closeness works, however, its effects are not as strong as in the 44 games. (In the original
experiment, the closer disc was claimed by 99 and 77% of the subjects in G2 and G1 respectively.) As a result, and in line
with Crawford et al.’s ﬁndings, closeness cues which increase efﬁciency signiﬁcantly in the equality-compatible game are
not as effective when agreement requires one player to accept a smaller share. The introduction of spatial cues has almost
no effect on efﬁciency in the 6:5 games, reduces efﬁciency slightly in the 8:3 games, and increases it signiﬁcantly – from
24.4 to 29.7% – in the 10:1 games.29
The implication seems to be that our bargaining table games differ from Crawford et al.’s matching games in terms of
both strategic complexity and framing, and that both of these factors contribute to the difference in the power of focal
points between the two designs. We suggest that in both respects, our design is likely to have greater external validity as a
model of tacit bargaining in the real world.
As far as strategic complexity is concerned, both experimental designs are far simpler than just about any real-world
bargaining problem. There is nothing wrong with that: useful experimental designs, like useful theoretical models, are
highly simpliﬁed representations of what can happen ‘in the wild’. But if behaviour in some class of simple experimental
games is found to vary systematically with the degree of strategic complexity, and if one wants to extrapolate from the
experimental results to behaviour in naturally occurring settings, it may seem reasonable to put more weight on the
evidence from the more complex experimental scenarios.
As we explained in the Introduction, the framing features that differentiate our bargaining table games from matching
games have analogues in many real-world problems of tacit bargaining. If, as we have conjectured in the light of our27 This treatment was suggested by an anonymous referee. We ran it at the same institution as the original experiment to avoid subject-pool effects.
Subjects who had taken part in similar studies were not allowed to participate. The full instructions can be found in Appendix B.
28 There was also a small change to the procedure for cancelling claims. Since in the new treatment a subject was allowed to claim only one disc, a
claim on a disc was automatically cancelled whenever the other disc was claimed.
29 It may be worth noting that, unless the distribution of claims is much more asymmetric than the random-choice benchmark, even relatively large
effects on individual claims can have very small effects on efﬁciency. So, for example, when 62% of participants claim the closer disc, standardised
efﬁciency is only 52.3%. Similarly, the difference in efﬁciency in the 10:1 games is signiﬁcant in spite of being small because the Wilcoxon test is based on
individual-level differences in expected payoffs.
Table 7
Claims, efﬁciency and distribution in 22 games.
5:5 6:5 8:3 10:1
Game description
N G4¼95,59 G3¼96,59 G15¼98,39 G16¼910,19
C G2¼59 95 G1¼69 95 G13¼89 93 G14¼109 91
Closer disc claims (%)a
All players (n¼100) 84.0*** 62.0** 52.0 54.0
Favoured (n¼50) n/a 66.0 70.0 86.0
Unfavoured (n¼50) n/a 58.0 34.0 22.0
Higher-value disc claims (%)
N (n¼100) n/a 48.0 71.0 86.0
C (n¼100) n/a 54.0 68.0 82.0
Benchmarks (%)
Nash efﬁciency 50.0 49.6 39.7 16.5
Blind efﬁciency 50.0 50.4 41.6 24.3
Standardised efﬁciency (%)
N 49.5 52.2 43.6 24.4
C 71.2 52.3 42.8 29.7
Power of relational cuesb
C 1.44*** 1.00 0.98 1.22***
Average claims fav/unfavc
C n/a 1.04** 1.03 1.09
Expected earnings fav/unfavc
C n/a 1.08* 1.09 1.57***
N, neutral; C, closeness; n/a, not applicable.
a Asterisks show signiﬁcance in two-tail exact binomial test (‘All players’ only): *10%, **5%, ***1%.
b Standardised efﬁciency in C as proportion of standardised efﬁciency in N. Asterisks show signiﬁcance in two-tail Wilcoxon signed-rank tests on
expected payoffs: *10%, **5%, ***1%.
c Ratio of average claims (expected earnings) of favoured players to average claims (expected earnings) of unfavoured players. Asterisks show
signiﬁcance in two-tail Mann–Whitney rank-sum tests on claims (expected earnings): *10%, **5%, ***1%.
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expecting it to have external validity. We suggest that distributional properties are often less relevant in real bargaining
than in laboratory implementations of fully-speciﬁed games. In many real situations, there is no single, homogenous unit
of payoff that is common knowledge between the players and that could therefore be used to specify distributional
concepts. In classical game theory, utility is the relevant unit, but real players typically lack information about one
another’s utility functions. In some real cases there is a salient unit of material payoff, but common knowledge is lacking.
(Think of proﬁt in the case of tacit bargaining between duopolists.) In other cases, there is not even an obvious unit.
(Consider a buyer and a seller bargaining over the price at which a car is to be sold. To specify equality in material payoffs,
they ﬁrst need a rate of equivalence between two material units, cars and money—and that is exactly what is in dispute
between them.) Typically, each bargainer can think more easily about her own payoffs, and is much better informed about
them, than about those of the other person. This may help to explain why object/claimant rules, which do not require
players to take account of one another’s payoffs, are commonly used to resolve real bargaining problems.7. Conclusion
We have developed an experimental design that captures signiﬁcant features of real problems of tacit bargaining, while
allowing sharp tests of Schelling’s hypotheses about the role of payoff-irrelevant relational cues in these problems. Our
results provide strong support for those hypotheses. As predicted by Schelling, payoff-irrelevant cues act as powerful focal
points in games that model tacit bargaining, with effects on both efﬁciency and distribution. We suggest that analyses of
tacit bargaining need to take account of subjectively perceived relations between claimants and disputed objects, whether
or not those relations are represented in conventional game-theoretic models.Acknowledgements
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